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FAIR USE IN JACKSON v. MPI HOME VIDEO.
WHY BOTHER?
Although Jesse Jackson ("Jackson") may have lost the 1988 Demo-
cratic primaries, he triumphed against a less daunting opponent in the
courtroom. Shortly after the Democratic Convention in July 1988, Jack-
son sued MPI Home Video ("MPI"), a video producer, for copyright
infringement of his convention speech.' A preliminary injunction was
issued against MPI 2 and the parties subsequently reached an undisclosed,
out-of- court settlement.3
One of the principal issues in Jackson v. MPI Home Video4 ("Jack-
son") was the application of the fair use doctrine.5 Fair use permits un-
authorized uses of original, copyrighted work.6 Fair use is an equitable
doctrine that approaches an alleged infringement from four perspectives:
the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work;
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential
market for the copyrighted work.7 These factors address the ultimate
question of a fair use analysis: the reasonableness of the use alleged to be
an infringement.' Thus, the fair use doctrine provides a framework for
intensive inquiry into the nature of the copyrighted work and its alleged
infringement. Rather than offering a rigid formula designed to produce a
precise solution, the doctrine puts forth general guideposts serving as a
basis for decision. Given its special focus on the circumstances, practical
application of fair use can result in a wide spectrum of answers to a fair
use problem.9
Not surprisingly, the flexibility of fair use has resulted in various
interpretations of the doctrine.'" This vulnerability to analytical clashes
supports the need for a less hurried fair use analysis, which is one of the
1. Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. I1. 1988).
2. Id. at 492-93.
3. "Rev. Jesse Jackson Settles Lawsuit Against Video Company," ENT. L. REP., Vol. 10,
No. 5, p. 19 (Oct. 1988).
4. 694 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
5. Id. at 489-91.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (1982).
8. N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 5:2 at 117 (1981 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
BOORSTYN].
9. 3 M. NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] at 13-82-84 (1989) [hereinafter
NIMMER].
10. Id.
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arguments considered by this note. "
In particular, additional weight should be given a fair use claim at
the preliminary injunction stage. The ease with which Jackson obtained
an injunction was rooted in the self-effacing nature of the fair use doc-
trine when applied to "uses" which appear so unseemly that a fair use
defense is dismissed as untenable. 2 Since preliminary injunctions may
prejudge a case, the fair use defense should play a more worthwhile role
when a preliminary injunction ruling is sought. Thus, this casenote will
examine the suppressed role of fair use, including its relationship to
plaintiff's burden.
Another problem concerning the fair use doctrine involves the
heavy emphasis on the commercial nature of the infringement. ' 3 Based
on a recent Supreme Court case, 4 this casenote will explain how this
emphasis may be faulty since the application of the "market effect" fac-
tor is inconsistent. In one scenario the market effect is recognized while
in another scenario it is swept under the rug because the circumstances
appear to be different. This problem is highlighted because the courts
have traditionally given more weight to the "market effect" factor, which
examines the commercial opportunities being exploited by the fair use
claimant. Both fair use problems-failure to play a meaningful role in a
preliminary injunction suit and inconsistent application of the "market
effect" factor-will be presented in the context of Jackson.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE - JACKSON V. MPI HOME VIDEO
A. Statement of Facts
On July 19, 1988, Jesse Jackson delivered a speech at the Demo-
cratic National Convention in Atlanta, Georgia. 5 At least 100 copies of
the speech were distributed earlier to the press for media quoting pur-
poses.' 6 The copies did not contain a copyright notification, but did con-
tain a statement restricting public use.'" Among those listening to
Jackson was Waleed Ali, president of Maljack Productions, Inc., d/b/a
11. See infra, note 88.
12. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
"[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright ... Id.
13. NIMMER at § 13.05[A] at 13-80-81.
14. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
15. Jesse Jackson was a presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, defeated by
Michael Dukakis in the 1988 primaries. In his speech, Jackson appealed to his constituents to
improve their socioeconomic status.
16. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 485.
17. Id.
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MPI Home Video ("MPI"). " Ali believed that the speech had commer-
cial possibilities and purchased a license from Grinberg Film Libraries
Inc. ("Grinberg") to use the American Broadcasting Company's
("ABC") news archive tape of Jackson's convention speech.' 9 MPI paid
$6,750.00 for the license.2 °
Having secured a master copy of the ABC coverage and a photo of
Jackson from World Wide Photos, MPI prepared the tape for distribu-
tion.2' Commercials and other extraneous materials were edited out of
the ABC master and packaging artwork was prepared.22 The videotape
package displayed, among other items: (1) a photograph of Jackson and
his name; (2) two quotations from the speech; (3) a description of the
tape as containing the "entire stirring Democratic National Convention
speech, uncut and unedited"; and (4) the name of MPI Home Video.23
At the bottom of the Grinberg licensing contract were written the follow-
ing words: "The film footage licensed hereunder may be used only for
the purpose specified .... [T]he licensor warrants nothing except its title
to the footage licensed and that the licensee assumes full responsibility
for any use which it may make of such footage."24 The World Wide
Photos sales form contained the following warning: "It may not be used
in such a manner as to violate the rights of any person, firm or corpora-
tion. It may not be used for advertising or purposes of trade unless writ-
ten consent of each living person depicted . . . shall be obtained .... 2
At an undetermined point, Jackson became aware of MPI's distribu-
tion of his speech for commercial purposes.26 In response to Jackson's
public objections to the use of his speech, Ali openly responded that (1)
Jackson did not authorize the tape because Ali did not ask him to do so,
18. MPI's catalog of the videos it distributes is wide-ranging, including feature films, con-
cert films and television series. There are also cassettes explaining public issues, including
works on public figures, political events and U.S. military conflicts around the globe. Jackson,
694 F. Supp. at 485-86.
19. ABC licenses Grinberg to license selected programs to third parties. Unless ABC re-
stricts a license, Grinberg is free to license whatever it is given by ABC. The written agree-
ment between them provides that Grinberg "shall have the right ... to make duplicates of
ABC film/cassettes and license said duplicates to third parties for stock footage purposes."
See Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 486.
20. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 485.
21. About eight thousand tapes were prepared. Prior to the court's order, about 7,100 had
been shipped, another 1,000 remaining with MPI. MPI anticipated a $3.00 profit per tape,
selling to wholesalers for about $7.50, retail price $14.95. Id.
22. Jackson, 694 F. Supp at 485.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 486.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 487.
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(2) Jackson was not involved in any aspect of the project, and (3) it was
permissible for MPI to profit from the words of a public figure.27
B. Holding of the Court
The court based its skepticism of MPI's fair use defense on the sheer
price of the license.2" There was little possibility that Grinberg did not
intend to "license a physical copy of some ABC news coverage to Mr.
Ali's company"29 and give MPI "rights to the content. ' 30 The court
concluded that "under the circumstances here it is clear that MPI
thought it bought and Grinberg thought it sold a valid license to dupli-
cate and sell copies of the ABC tape."'"
MPI did not succeed in defeating Jackson's motion for a preliminary
injunction.32 Based on the court's evaluation, Jackson satisfied the pre-
liminary injunction requirements, 33 and MPI's fair use defense failed to
rebut Jackson's satisfaction of the preliminary injunction test. 34 The
court finally determined that Jackson was entitled to a preliminary in-
junction.35 Thus, MPI was barred from distributing the tapes.36 Jackson
secured the sole right to market his speech and reap the financial benefits.
C. Trial Court's Reasoning
1. Does Jackson Meet the Requirements for Issuing a Preliminary
Injunction?
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Jackson had to show: (1) a bet-
ter than negligible probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
injury; (3) lack of serious adverse effect on the defendants; and (4) that
the injunction is not inconsistent with the public interest.37 Because a
final determination under part one of the test rested on the court's analy-
sis of MPI's defenses, the court determined the likelihood of Jackson's
success on the merits last.38 It is this standard, the likelihood of success
27. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 487.
28. Id. at 486.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 492-93.
33. Id. at 487-88.
34. Id. at 489-90.
35. Id. at 493.
36. Id.
37. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 493.
38. Id. at 487.
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on the merits, which part of this casenote questions.39
A showing of irreparable injury was not a difficult hurdle for Jack-
son to clear." The "injury" is defined in terms of the speech's dimin-
ished market potential, as a result of competition with an infringing tape,
and the effect the copyright controversy would have on consumer
preferences.4'
As for serious adverse effect on defendants, the court did not decide
what effect the preliminary injunction would produce. A more in-depth
analysis of this issue was left to a final injunction hearing.4 2 The court
placed the burden on the defendants to show that sales would be reduced
by a "short additional delay in their distribution."43
Despite the defendants' efforts, the court found that the preliminary
injunction was fully consistent with the public interest:
Protection of copyright and prevention of practices which have
a tendency to deceive are clearly consistent with the public in-
terest in the creation of other original works fostered by copy-
right protection and in the avoidance of deception of the public.
Moreover, failure to protect copyright (by denying the prelimi-
nary injunction) is inconsistent with the public interest."
MPI argued that an injunction would be inconsistent with the public in-
terest because it would hinder news reporting of political events.45 The
court disagreed, noting that various alternatives to infringement
existed.46
2. MPI's Defense of Fair Use of Jackson's Speech
Among its defenses,4 7 MPI pleaded fair use of Jackson's copyrighted
39. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
40. Irreparable injury "may normally be presumed from a showing of copyright infringe-
ment." Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th
Cir. 1982).
41. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 488. The effect on consumer preferences would, presumably,
be to avoid buying a product "enmeshed in controversy." Id.
42. Id. at 488. The final injunction hearing, of course, never occurred because the parties
reached an out-of-court settlement of the dispute. Id
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 488. For example, Congress could amend the copyright law
removing protection from candidate speeches or setting specific royalties, party committees
could require speakers to waive copyright in order to speak, the media could negotiate royalty
arrangements with the copyright holders, or the problem could simply be ignored, assuming
no one has any time or incentive to block the distribution of their political stumping. Id.
47. MPI's first defense was that their videotape was protected by the First Amendment,
the perennial thorn in copyright law. However, the court found no basis for MPI's claim,
1990]
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speech.4" The court assessed the defense based on the four factors set out
by the statute-purpose and character of the use, nature of the copy-
righted work, amount and substantiality of the use and effect on the mar-
ket-and determined that the fair use doctrine was inapplicable to
defendants' use.49
Subsection (1) of Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides
that in determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use, the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational pur-
poses, is to be considered.5° The court found that the purpose was news
reporting for profit.5 ' Profit or not, news reporting has been deemed a
proper use under the fair use doctrine.52 MPI distinguished its conduct
from the defendant's conduct in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises53 ("Nation"). In the Nation case, Harper & Row obtained
exclusive rights to publish former President Gerald Ford's memoirs, in-
cluding pre-publication excerpts. 4 After illicitly obtaining the excerpts,
The Nation magazine published them without authorization. 55 Justice
quoting from Harper & Row v. Nation Enter., 451 U.S. 539, 559 (1985): "It is fundamentally
at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest
importance to the public." Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 489.
MPI questioned Jackson's copyright interest on grounds that it had been abandoned.
Nevertheless, despite the absence of copyright notice, it was more probable than not that MPI
would not prevail on this issue: Jackson's delay in obtaining copyright protection is not evi-
dence of an intent to abandon his protectable interests, rather, the court viewed his neglect as
"mere inaction," cured within a "short time." Id. at 490-91.
A related but doomed challenge to the copyright was forfeiture through publication with-
out copyright notice. The Act provides that failure to notify does not invalidate the copyright
if the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small number of copies. 17
U.S.C. § 405(a)(1) (1982). In addition to having more than a negligible probability of prevail-
ing on this issue, the court deemed Jackson to have a reasonable probability of prevailing on
the basis of § 405(a)(2) which saves a copyright where "a reasonable effort is made to add
notice to all copies that are distributed to the public ... after the omission has been discov-
ered." Id. at 491 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (1982)).
Finally, MPI argued that it was an innocent infringer under § 405(b) of the Act. What on
the surface looked like a "good chance" to win on this issue was quickly cast into doubt by the
court, noting that MPI's responses to Jackson's protests are evidence of anything but the inno-
cence which it so pleads. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 491-92.
48. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 489.
49. Id. at 490.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982).
51. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 489.
52. See, e.g., Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); Consumers Union v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1049 (2d Cir. 1984).
53. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
54. Id. at 542.
55. Id. at 543.
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O'Connor held that The Nation's unauthorized publication of verbatim
quotes from essentially the "heart" of unpublished presidential memoirs,
which was to harm the copyright holder's right of first publication, was
not a fair use.56 However, unlike the defendant in that case, MPI did not
know that the material was copyrighted, did not obtain the material by
theft or any other improper means, and did not deliberately supplant the
right of first publication.57
The court next examined the nature of the copyrighted work in rela-
tion to the alleged infringement:5" Jackson's speech qualified as an origi-
nal literary work.59 But, as the Supreme Court noted in the Nation case,
even "substantial quotations" of a publicly delivered speech may qualify
as fair use.' Unfortunately for MPI, more than "substantial quotations"
were used in its reproduction.6'
The court treated the third factor, the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work,62 without elabora-
tion. MPI used one of the derivative works protected under Jackson's
copyright in its entirety.63 The court stated that MPI's defense that fair
use of an entire work is permissible failed because MPI based its defense
on Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 6' where the
unadulterated use was non-commercial.65
Finally, the court applied the fourth factor determining fair use-
the effect of the use upon the potential market value of the copyrighted
work.6 6 MPI attempted to argue that Jackson would remain unaffected
by its fair use of the work because he had no plans to market the
speech. 67 The court disagreed, observing Jackson's intention to market
his copyrighted work and the statute's reference to "potential" as op-
posed to actual market.6" Therefore, Jackson's failure to engage in mar-
keting activities was irrelevant.69
56. Id.
57. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 489.
58. Id. at 489-90.
59. Id. at 490.
60. Nation, 451 U.S. at 564.
61. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 490.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982).
63. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 490.
64. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
65. Id. at 449-51 (no copyright infringement involved in sale of video recorders to individ-
uals who tape TV programs without authorization).
66. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 490.
67. Id. Defendants argued Jackson had manufactured no tapes himself, and that there
was no indication of any packaging and distribution plans. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
1990]
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE
A. The Meaning of Copyright
Congress enacted the first copyright law in 1790 pursuant to a con-
stitutional grant of power.7° Following revisions to the 1790 law and a
1909 Act,7' the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act") was passed.72 One
commentator stated that "the purpose of affording copyright protection
is to grant valuable rights to authors thereby encouraging the production
of literary and artistic works of lasting public benefit. This is the ration-
ale for the limited copyright monopoly."
73
The fundamental economic principle behind copyright law demon-
strates why part of a fair use analysis consists of the commercial nature
of the infringement. 74 This part of fair use analysis is in part a stopgap
measure which preserves the economic underpinning of copyright law.
That is, copyright law awards the right to exploit a work first and fore-
most to the original author of the work in question. This right is the
economic incentive to publish ideas, knowing that one's expression of
those ideas will be protected. 75 Were the expression unprotected, the in-
centive would be nonexistent: the value of the expression would dwindle
if duplication of one's work went unchecked. For this reason our society
has devised a concept such as "copyright" which is based in large part on
commercial or economic philosophy-the result is a special focus on the
commercial characteristics posed by the infringement.
Section 106 of the Act lists the rights to which the copyright holder
is entitled.7 6 "Subject to the complex and detailed limitations and ex-
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Id.
71. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 9 (1978). The 1909 Act
provided no exceptions regarding copyright protection of printed works. However, it allowed
a qualified exemption for copying anything else, and two exemptions for performances of pro-
tected work. Still uncodified, fair use governed some exceptions as a judicial doctrine. Id. at
12.
72. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
73. BOORSTYN § 1:2 at 3.
74. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
75. Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 106 provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following-
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
[Vol. 10
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emptions set forth in sections 107 through 118 of the Act, the copyright
owner has the sole right to exercise any of the exclusive rights of copy-
right and, conversely, to exclude others from exercising any of such
rights.""
In Jackson, the specific right which concerned Jackson was the right
"to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,"78 in this
case, a commercial, videotaped version of his convention speech.7 9 To
constitute an infringement of the copyrighted work, the derivative work
must be based upon the copyrighted work-an adaptation which incor-
porates a portion of the copyrighted work in some form." A simple,
concise definition of infringement is, therefore, the unauthorized use of
copyrighted material.8"
B. Fair Use in Copyright Law
The copyright holder's "bundle of rights" listed in section 106 is
subject to a number of qualifications and exceptions. Among them is
Section 107 of the Act 2 which codifies the judicial doctrine of fair use,
one of the most important and well-established limitations on the exclu-
sive rights of copyright.8" The defense of fair use has been raised in nu-
merous cases on the ground that the defendant's use of plaintiff's work
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic or sculptural works, including the individual images of a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
77. BOORSTYN § 4:1 at 97.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982).
79. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 492.
80. BOORSTYN § 4:3 at 100.
81. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 702 (5th ed. 1979).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 107 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
83. BOORSTYN § 5:2 at 117.
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was fair and, thus, not an unlawful appropriation or infringement.8 4 The
principle of fair use is the most far-reaching of the restrictions on the
exclusive rights when used as a defense.8 5
The concept is so flexible that it defies definition independent of a
given fact pattern. 6 As an equitable rule of reason,8 ' the doctrine has
never been precisely defined. Cases dealing with the question of fair use
have relied solely on the facts to define the limits of the doctrine.88 Once
a court has determined that the use made of a work was a "fair use" such
use does not constitute an infringement of the copyright, despite the ex-
clusive rights belonging to the copyright holder outlined in Section 106.89
The application of fair use usually constitutes a mixed issue of law
and fact.9" Determining the factual sufficiency of the defense, however, is
a difficult undertaking. Part of the difficulty can be explained by the in-
consistent interpretations derived from the doctrine prior to its codifica-
tion.9 One court held that an insubstantial similarity was not actionable
and was therefore a "fair use."9 2 Other courts have suggested that fair
use arises when there is copying of the theme or ideas, but not of the
expression of ideas.93 At least prior to 1978,"4 it was possible to declare
84. See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621
F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("While the fact that [television network] sought to profit financially
from its telecasts of [sports events in connection with which the network used three short
segments of plaintiff's film biography of a champion wrestler] does not, standing alone, deprive
... [the network] of the fair use defense, it was relevant that the film was used by the network
at least in part for commercial exploitation ....") (citation omitted); Diamond v. Am-Law
Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (Under copyright law's fair use provision,
"informational ... works may be more freely published than those of a creative nature.")
(citation omitted); Consumers Union v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.
1984) ("Since the risk of restraining free flow of information is more significant with informa-
tional work [rather than creative,] the scope of permissible fair use of copyrighted work is
greater.") (citations omitted).
85. BOORSTYN § 5:2 at 117.
86. Id.
87. The term "equitable" refers to that which is in harmony with general principles and
notions of fairness. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (5th ed. 1979).
88. Diamond, 745 F.2d at 147. The Diamond court stated:
[In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use,]
the appraisal of these four statutory factors is obviously a fact specific inquiry for
which summary judgment is ill-suited but not unknown where no material dispute of
fact exists and a reasonable trier can reach only one conclusion.
Id. (citations omitted).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
90. Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985). The doctrine incorporates the specific activity and surrounding
circumstances within the framework established by the four factors. Id.
91. NIMMER at § 13.05[A] at 13-64-65.
92. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir. 1944).
93. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
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that fair use of a copyrighted work meant that the similarities between
the original and derivative work were not substantial.95 This definition
was not helpful because it merely led the fact finder back to the substan-
tial similarity inquiry. The inquiry begs the essential question of the doc-
trine: a finding of fair use does not necessitate an absence of substantial
similarity; rather, the proper enunciation of the law is that despite a find-
ing of substantial similarity, fair use may be properly invoked.96
The four factors listed in Section 107 (purpose and character of the
use; nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the
effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work)
serve as guideposts, and do not represent an exhaustive list of means by
which to find fair use.97 In addition, the statute does not purport to as-
sign any particular weight to any one factor.98 Each factor is defined in
general terms, and the courts have much discretion to determine whether
any given factor applies to a given case.99
1. The First Factor: Purpose and Character of the Defendant's Use
The first factor listed in Section 107 is "the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
non-profit educational purposes.' This factor alone does not specify
which uses are "fair" and which are not. However, the preamble to Sec-
tion 107 does make mention of certain "fair" purposes."°" The first fac-
tor embodies, to a limited extent, the principle of "productive use,"l°2--a
use which offers exceptional public benefit and is thus generally allowed.
Productive use describes a work of authorship whereby the copier adds
his or her own original contribution to that which is copied. 103
The extent to which the "productive use" requirement limits the
94. The Copyright Act of 1976 became effective in 1978.
95. NIMMER § 13.05 at 13-64.
96. Id. at 13-65.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 13-66.
99. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982). "In so saying, the statute somewhat unrealistically paints
the world into two corners-the venal commercial and the altruistic instructive. In fact, pub-
lishers of educational textbooks are as profit-motivated as publishers of scandal-mongering
tabloid newspapers." Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987).
101. See supra note 82.
102. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
103. NIMMER § 13.05[A] at 13-68.
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availability of a fair use defense was prescribed in Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America 104 ("Sony"). Sony involved a suit by the
Universal-MCA production studios against Sony Corporation. °5 The
complaint alleged that Sony was liable for copyright infringement for
selling Betamax videotape recorders which were used by consumers to
tape copyrighted television programs.10 6 The Sony appeals court held
that the defense of fair use may not be invoked, "[u]nless there [was] a
'productive use' in the sense that the copier himself is engaged in creating
a work of authorship whereby he adds his own original contribution to
that which is copied .... ,07
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Sony, stating that
the defense of fair use is not "rigidly circumscribed" by the productive
use requirement."0 8 The Court held that neither private individuals in
general nor Sony Corporation were liable for infringement based on the
individual's fair use defense."° Thus, the decision represents a compro-
mise between "copyright" and the reality of private activity which can-
not be practicably policed.
An additional consideration under the first factor examines the de-
fendant's conduct in view of the circumstances."' 0 As an equitable doc-
trine, courts have held that where the defendant baldly denies any
wrongdoing despite contrary evidence courts may deny the defendant the
benefit of a "fair use" defense." ' "Good faith and fair dealing" may also
be additional considerations when examining the propriety of defendant's
conduct.1 2 This particularly would apply where the defendant has di-
rect contact with the plaintiff regarding use of a copyrighted work.
As with all standards dependent on factual inquiry, a court's obser-
vations made under the first factor do not decide the fair use issue dis-
positively; rather, it is ultimately balanced against (or added to) the other
factors before a final decision is reached. Perhaps the courts have given
undue exclusionary powers to the issue of commerciality of the use:
"every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an un-
fair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of
104. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
105. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
106. Id.
107. NIMMER § 13.05[A] at 13-68.
108. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454 n.40.
109. Id. at 456.
110. NIMMER § 13.05[A] at 13-73.
111. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d
57 (2d Cir. 1980).
112. Alternatively, a defendant's good faith may provide stark contrast to the plaintiff's
questionable work. NIMMER, § 13.05[A] at 13-74.
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the copyright.""' 3 It will become evident that the problem of com-
merciality is exacerbated by the entrenched approach to what appears to
be a free transfer of interests: the fair use claimant may be viewed as
borrowing an idea from someone else without obligation. Perhaps the
bottom-line is this: copyright abhors freeriders and fair use claimants are
prima facie freeriders if they have participated in the market.
2. The Second Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor listed in Section 107 is "the nature of the copy-
righted work."' 4 This factor "is meant to convey the thought that cer-
tain works by their very nature are more susceptible to copying or other
uses, than others.""' 5 The idea is that the courts have realized that
although some works are of such widespread use, the purpose for the use
is so innocent and narrow that the use is deemed permissible. For exam-
ple, textbooks and other material prepared primarily for the school mar-
kets would be more susceptible to reproduction for classroom use than
material prepared for general public distribution.
3. The Third Factor: Amount and Substantiality of the Use
The third factor listed in Section 107 is "the amount and substanti-
ality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole." "6 This factor requires review of both the quantity and quality
of the "portion" used. The use of an entire work, or otherwise "whole-
sale" duplication, can never be fair use. 1 7 Generally speaking, as the
amount and substantiality of the parts used increase, the likelihood that a
court will find a fair use decreases."
18
4. The Fourth Factor: The Use's Effect on the Market
The last factor considered is the "effect of the use upon the potential
113. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451:
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that
the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would ad-
versely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm
need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder with no
defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that
future harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended use is
for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommer-
cial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated. Id. at 451.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982).
115. BOORSTYN § 5:2 at 123.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982).
117. BOORSTYN § 5:2 at 123.
118. Id. at 123-24.
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market for or value of the copyrighted work." ' 9 This is probably the
most important element of a fair use inquiry. "This factor ... poses the
issue of whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged
in by the defendant ... would result in a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market for or value of the plaintiff's present work."12 The
function of the use will be determinative depending upon whether the
defendant's work essentially replaces the demand for plaintiff's original
work or merely complements it. 2 '
C. The Supreme Court's Application of Fair Use in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
One of the underlying themes of this article is that the fair use doc-
trine is, for better or worse, malleable. The doctrine's flexibility lent itself
to pointed criticism by the dissent in the recent Supreme Court case,
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 122 ("Nation"), a
presentation of which is critical to an understanding of fair use deficien-
cies. Former President Gerald Ford contracted with Harper & Row to
publish his memoirs, 23 granting Harper & Row the "exclusive right to
license prepublication excerpts, known in the trade as 'first serial
rights.' ",124 Unbeknownst to Harper & Row, The Nation magazine sur-
reptitiously obtained a copy of Ford's manuscript and gratuitously pub-
lished a first serial on Ford's yet unpublished memoirs. 125  Harper &
Row sued The Nation for infringement, seeking damages resulting from
Time magazine's cancellation of its deal.' 26 The Nation magazine raised
the fair use defense.
127
The district court rejected The Nation's fair use claim based on the
diminished value of the copyright. 128 The Second Circuit reversed, rec-
ognizing the news-like value of The Nation's article and the relatively
119. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
120. NIMMER § 13.05[A] at 13-81 (footnotes omitted). Diminution of market value in
plaintiff's works "is not lessened by the fact that their author has disavowed the intention to
publish them during his lifetime. * * * He is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his letters
.... .Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987).
121. BOORSTYN § 5:2 at 124-25: "[A] book review, for example, will not as a rule satisfy
the consumer demand or substitute for the original work, despite liberal quotations from the
book, and is therefore generally accepted as a fair use." Id.
122. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
123. Id. at 542.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 543.
126. Id.
127. Nation, 471 U.S. at 544.
128. 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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minute verbatim quote from Ford's work. 29
The Supreme Court, in a six to three vote 130 reversed the Second
Circuit, and decided that The Nation's appropriation was not within fair
use standards.' 3' The Court's opinion was accompanied by a detailed
dissent, which made equally credible counter-arguments for each of the
majority's findings on fair use.
132
In analyzing the first factor, the purpose of the use, the Court took a
critical stance. It underscored the purloined nature of The Nation's
source, the profit motive and the notable absence of any otherwise placat-
ing addition such as an independent analysis of Ford's work. 3 3 The dis-
sent argued that The Nation's article fell under "news reporting"-a
presumably "fair" category under Section 107.134 As such, it required no
complementary text by The Nation and profit seeking was perfectly ac-
ceptable. 35 This argument was based on the "news reporting" exception
under Section 107,136 which states that when news alone is being dissemi-
nated, the need to add independent commentary is unnecessary and the
use is entirely fair.'
37
Secondly, the Court was sensitive to The Nation's uninhibited use of
an unpublished and confidential document finding the unique nature of
the excerpts worked against the fair use claim. 3  The dissent found this
point irrelevant, stating that the public value of making available the
thoughts of a former president far outweighed any marketing deals be-
tween Harper & Row and Time magazine.
139
As for the amount of copying, the majority clung to the "heart of
the book" view taken by the trial court.'" The dissent implemented
both a quantitative test, finding the verbatim quotes to be de minimis,
and a qualitative test, declaring that the quotes were essential to the over-
all content and nature of the news report. 4 '
129. 723 F.2d 195, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1983).
130. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion; Justice Brennan, with whom Justices
White and Marshall joined, dissented.
131. Nation, 471 U.S. at 569.
132. Id. at 579-605.
133. Id. at 561-62.
134. Id. at 590-91.
135. Id. at 590.
136. See supra note 82.
137. NiMMER § 13.05[A] at 13-68-69.
138. Nation, 471 U.S. at 564.
139. Id. at 595.
140. Id. at 564-65.
141. Id. at 598-99. The quantitative test looks to the volume of copying of the copyrighted
work, ignoring the amount of non-infringing material appearing in the infringing work. The
qualitative test, however, assesses the qualitative value of the copied material regardless of the
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Regarding market effect, the majority relied on the causal link be-
tween The Nation's infringement and the cancellation by Time magazine
of its serial licensing contract with Harper & Row, a $12,500 loss suf-
fered by Harper & Row. 142 The dissent's position on this issue was less
vigorous. The dissent merely questioned causation between the publish-
ing of an insubstantial quote and the purported, absolute ruin of the li-
cense's commercial potential.
14 3
Nimmer offered harsh criticism of the Nation case:
[G]iven the general language of the factors contained in Section
107 and the absence of guidelines for their implementation, rea-
sonable minds can look at different aspects of a single situation
and reach opposite conclusions regarding purpose, nature,
amount of copying, and market effect. Moreover, even if the
factors are analyzed as above so that two favor a finding of fair
use while two disfavor such a finding, there is no guidance as to
which conflicting factors prevail over others. When combined
with the emphasis on case-by-case adjudication in this area, the
factors thus tend to degenerate into post-hoc rationales for an-
tecedent conclusions, rather than serving as tools for
analysis.'44
Nimmer explains that because of the potential for divergence in a Section
107 analysis, perhaps an additional test is required, namely, the func-
tional test:
In determining the effect of the defendant's use upon the poten-
tial market for or value of the plaintiff's work, a comparison
must be made not merely of the media in which the two works
may appear, but rather in terms of the function of each such
work regardless of media.
14 5
Medium aside, if the defendant's work contains substantially similar ma-
terial but functions differently than that of plaintiff, the defense of fair
use may be available.
146
Applied to the Nation case, the functional test would assess the det-
rimental effect of The Nation's article on any of the rights in President
volume of copying done. Thus, the "heart of the book" view emphasizes the substance and
nature of the copyrighted use in relation to the overall work. Id.
142. Nation, 471 U.S. at 567.
143. Id. at 602-03.
144. NIMMER § 13.05[B] at 13-83-84 (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 13-84 (footnotes omitted).
146. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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Ford's work, regardless of the actual exercise of those rights.147 Time
magazine absorbed a loss14 sufficient to deny any claim of fair use. The
precise effect on the book market need not form a part of this conclusion.
Nimmer admits the resemblance of the functional test to the fourth
factor under Section 107, but points out that the test can be used to fur-
ther characterize the other factors, notably, the second one, which exam-
ines the nature of the copyrighted work. 4 9 In the Nation case, the court
notes that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control
the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will out-
weigh a claim of fair use,"150 without defining what circumstances would
be "extraordinary" so as to overcome this presumption.' 5 l According to
Nimmer, the functional test resolves this issue: in the Nation case, the
court examined the copyrighted work, and all rights associated with it.
Given the nature of the manuscript, pre-publication could not be excused
as fair use. ' 52 However, the functional test theoretically would allow pre-
publication as fair use, in "extraordinary" cases. 153 Nimmer's example
of an extraordinary case is a pre-publication excerpt of a book dealing
with a very technical subject-the publication of the excerpt presumably
would have no detrimental impact on future sales of the book because the
excerpt is otherwise useless to the particular consumer who needs the
entire work regardless.' 54 Accordingly, a work of such blandness which
lacks any confidentiality such that unauthorized pre-publication excerpts
would have little or no effect on the value of the unpublished work may
serve to illustrate an "extraordinary" case.' 55 Given the emergence of
fair use debate at the Supreme Court level, this note suggests that a more
thorough examination of specific fair use issues should begin not at the
Supreme Court level, but at the district court level, including preliminary
proceedings.
147. NIMMER § 13.05[B] at 13-84.
148. The price of the first serial license was $25,000. By the time of the Nation's publica-
tion, Time had paid the first of two equal installments, thus absorbing a $12,500 loss upon
cancellation of the licensing agreement. Nation, 471 U.S. at 542-43.
149. NIMMER § 13.05[B] at 13-89.
150. Nation, 471 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. NIMMER § 13.05[B] at 13-88.
153. Id. at 13-90.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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III. NEED FOR INCREASED INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FAIR USE
DEFENSE AND THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
REQUIREMENTS IN JACKSON
Jackson only sought a preliminary injunction, pursuant to section
502(a) of the Copyright Act.1"6 In a preliminary injunction suit, the is-
sue before the court is not whether there has been infringement as a mat-
ter of law, but rather certainty of victory at trial, and whether the court is
convinced by the prospects of that outcome. 15 7 The court may deny a
preliminary injunction if the plaintiff's damages appear to be trivial, the
defendant acted in reliance on the absence of copyright notice, the de-
fendant would suffer undue hardship, or the plaintiff fails to show imme-
diate irreparable injury.158 Additionally, some courts hold that a
preliminary injunction may issue despite the existence of a plausible de-
fense, as long as the movant demonstrates a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess.1 59 The doctrine of fair use should enjoy a more meaningful degree
of influence over adjudication of a claim seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion. The "negligible probability" standard imposes an insignificant bur-
den on a plaintiff; the burden is lopsided when compared to the high
standards imposed on a fair use claim and the ironic summary analysis it
receives.
In order for a preliminary injunction motion to succeed, the movant
must show a better than negligible probability of success on the merits.'6°
It would seem that the "negligible probability" minimum is such that it
virtually wipes out any effect a fair use defense could possibly have at the
preliminary injunction stage. Perhaps the negligible probability test is
too easy as it results in a superficial and oversimplified approval on the
merits and ignores the possibility of a fair use defense as nothing more
than a "plausible" but essentially harmless impediment to plaintiff's case.
A preliminary injunction claim should not be so facilitated by a
"negligible probability" standard especially given the possibly preemp-
tive effects of the doctrine. In evaluating the likelihood of plaintiff's suc-
cess at trial on the copyright infringement issue, if the defendant's
likelihood of prevailing on a fair use defense outweighs the plaintiff's
likelihood, the burden on the plaintiff (to prove more than "negligible
probability") is necessarily affected. Accepting the "plausibility" of a
156. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1982).
157. NIMMER § 14:06[A] at 14-48.
158. Id. at § 13:05[A] at 14-50-53.
159. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d
1184 (5th Cir. 1979).
160. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 487.
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fair use defense while simultaneously stripping it of its power and effect
in a preliminary injunction hearing may leave the fair use doctrine sub-
stantively wanting. If the defense is at least plausible, the likelihood of
plaintiff's success at trial should be examined more thoroughly. Perhaps
the issuing of a preliminary injunction should not be so readily granted
and should require that the plaintiff make a more demanding but not
impossible showing. While the issuance of an injunction is not wholly
determinative, the injunction at times serves as an indication of the ulti-
mate result based on a full-blown trial. For this reason, facile issuance of
the injunction should be avoided, especially given the prominence and
wide acceptance of the doctrine of fair use.
The Nation case does not simply exemplify semantical and academic
skirmishing. The debate in Nation reflected the reality of endless and
unanswered questioning of fair use defense limits and the need to give
fair use more consideration from the defendant's standpoint by moving
beyond judicial lip-service of congressional intent. This need is particu-
larly true in a motion for preliminary injunction, where the requirements
of plaintiff's burden are highlighted against the background of staunch
copyright theory, thus overshadowing the doctrine of fair use. Thus, fair
use, in order to command the legitimacy it is due, must be given a fair
shot. If not revised, the negligible probability standard must be subjected
to more scrutiny when confronted by a fair use defense.
IV. APPLYING THE NATION CASE AND SONY TO JACKSON: A
HYPOTHETICAL DISSENT AND AN ILLUSORY "MARKET
EFFECT" FACTOR
The first factor the Jackson court looked at was the purpose and
character of MPI's use of Jackson's convention speech and whether it
was commercial or noncommercial. 6 1 The court concluded that because
Jackson lacked an argument against MPI he could not prevail on this
factor. 162 The court's characterization of Jackson's argument as "weak"
could conceivably mean "negligible." In addition, none of the "aggravat-
ing elements" present in the Nation case are present here: MPI did not
obtain the video by theft and the absence of copyright notice along with
its purchase of the license from Grinberg reveal good faith not present in
the Nation case. Therefore, it appears that Jackson would have a less
than negligible probability in prevailing on the first factor of fair use.
161, Id. at 489. See also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
162. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 489.
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Indeed, it appears that MPI has more than a mere "probable" defense to
the infringement.
The second fair use factor is the nature of the copyrighted work. 16
3
Unlike the Nation case, Jackson's speech was publicly delivered before a
wide audience spanning the United States."6 Around 150 copies were
delivered to the press. 165 Jackson wanted his speech to be disseminated
to maximize the public's knowledge of the speech, and obviously, of him-
self and his political beliefs. 166 Former President Ford, on the other
hand, was not a public figure at the time he wrote his memoirs. 167 He
was a private individual who prepared his yet unpublished and confiden-
tial memoirs. The monetary value of Ford's memoirs was probably more
than Jackson's speech, which was anything but confidential. The dis-
sent's rationale in the Nation case is more powerful: the public value of
disseminating the thoughts of a presidential candidate conceivably out-
weighed Jackson's questionable need to maintain his speech on the shelf
after delivering it before millions of people.
The third factor is the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. 16  On the surface, it
appears that Jackson wins: MPI reproduced the entire speech.169 How-
ever, it has been held that fair use of an entire work is appropriate where
the use is noncommercial. 170 The circumstances in Jackson trigger anal-
ysis under the fourth fair use factor, the market effect. 17 1 In Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America 172 ("Sony"), the Court noted
that taping of television programs by individuals for private use did not
constitute infringement, nor did Sony's sale of Betamax machines to
these individuals have any copyright infringement implications by associ-
ation or otherwise. 
73
Consider the following hypothetical: viewers 1 through 7,000
163. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
164. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 485.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 487.
167. While admittedly a term of art, Ford is not deemed a public figure in the sense that he
was not involved in any public pursuit the developments of which would be within the public
domain.
168. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
169. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 485.
170. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50. ("[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted
audiovisual work ... and that [recording] merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he
had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge .. . that the entire work is reproduced
... does not ... militate against a finding of fair use.") (footnote omitted). Id.
171. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
172. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
173. Id. at 456.
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(roughly the number of videotapes MPI shipped) tape a movie on televi-
sion, which is on videotape or will later be made available on videotape.
Provided their recording is limited to personal use, none of the viewers is
liable for any infringement, because the use is "noncommercial" under
Sony. 74 But cumulatively, the use may not be so "noncommercial."
Cumulatively, 7,000 copies of the television program have been made.
The 7,000 viewers who otherwise would have bought or rented the tape
(theoretically) are no longer potential customers in the manufacturer's
market for the videotape. There seems to be clear economic impact, yet
the Court held no infringement because the use is fair; therefore, there is
no liability under Sony. 75 The Sony Court alluded to such a possibility,
but backed down from endorsing a presumption of economic impact,
which is otherwise present where the activity is plainly commercial.'
7 6
This argument may be relevant to MPI's enterprise. Instead of
viewers 1 through 7,000 individually taping Jackson's speech with impu-
nity, these viewers have instead chosen to either watch the speech with-
out taping, or not watch the speech with the expectation that another
individual will make Jackson's oratory available in the video market.
The only difference between the scenarios in Sony and Jackson is that
instead of the viewer taping, the viewer has "assigned" and paid someone
else to do the job the viewer could have done independently without in-
curring liability. Thus, MPI made 7,000 or so copies of Jackson's speech
and Jackson is out 7,000 customers. MPI alone is penalized, but the
7,000 viewers are not. Given the above example, it seems that the fourth
factor, effect on the market, may be an inaccurate criterion because it
may hold that there are two types of market effects-a diluted market
effect as seen in Sony and a concentrated market effect in Jackson. This
distinction, an illusory one, results in an inconsistent application of the
market effect factor.
Thus, the essential question is whether there is any substantive dif-
ference between the market effect in Sony and the market effect here. By
asking this question, the irrelevant defense MPI raised in the preliminary
injunction hearing-that Jackson had no current plans to market his
speech-is avoidable. If the net effects in Sony and Jackson are identical,
174. Id.
175. Id. at 454-55.
176. Id. at 451. ("A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires
proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the . . . work. . . . [If the intended use] is for a
noncommercial purpose, the likelihood [of future harm] must be demonstrated.") Id.
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the public's interest in being able to readily obtain a copy of a major
public figure's speech is not to be dismissed.
To tie the above argument in with the fair use factors would be to
say that at least two of the factors-purpose and character of the use and
market effect-have helped perpetrate the illusion that commercial im-
pact is an absolute principle. It is not. Given the interdependence of the
four factors, one would think that other facts and aspects of a given de-
fense would further bolster the argument that the doctrine must keep
apace with an everchanging society.
The effect of this argument on current fair use theory, if accepted,
would be enormous. The first factor of the doctrine, purpose and charac-
ter of the use, may no longer sound the defendant's death knell in com-
mercial scenarios. More important is the effect on the fourth factor,
market effect. This criterion would necessarily be moot if the "diluted-
concentrated" dichotomy explored above proves false. In the final analy-
sis, the doctrine may need some revamping.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fair use doctrine reflects the need to regulate the author's rights
in his or her work amid the pressures of a technologically demanding
environment. The nature of an information society, combined with a
strong interest in facilitating unhindered dissemination of knowledge, in-
evitably produces compromises such as the doctrine of fair use.
Barring a change in the "negligible probability" standard for ob-
taining a preliminary injunction, the courts should be more careful in
granting preliminary injunctions where a fair use defense is presented in
good faith by the defendant. The standard as it stands indicates that the
fair use defense must be absolute and indomitable for it to have effect in a
preliminary injunction hearing. But court decisions exemplified by the
Nation case have indicated that this is not so. The preliminary injunction
in the "copyright vs. fair use" scenario should perhaps be barred alto-
gether or the standard the plaintiff must meet should be modified.
In addition, courts' zealous concern with market effect and substan-
tiality of the use has saturated cases involving fair use leaving the doc-
trine nowhere. Thus, perhaps fair use needs redefinition. Admittedly,
balancing the competing interests involved-the author's exclusive rights
vs. free flow of commerce and first amendment concerns-is a delicate
task. However, the compromise between competing interests should not
excuse continued application of a doctrine which suffers from inherent
theoretical contradiction.
Nevertheless, Sony and the above hypothetical may be reconciled:
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on its face, MPI's conduct is simply more blatant than the conduct of
each individual viewer taping a program; the viewer did not "profit"
from the taping. But what is the point of recognizing fair use on the one
hand yet condemning its possible economic advantages and thus rejecting
the defense? We may require a few more dissents such as the Nation case
in order for fair use to claim a true victory.
Timothy Kevane

